Skip to main content

STATE OF ORISSA v. BHAGABAN BARIK, 1987

STATE OF ORISSA v. BHAGABAN BARIK, 1987

Petitioner: State of Orissa

Respondent: Bhagaban Barik

FACTS

The deceased was returning from the house of a villager after reciting bhagbat where some other villagers including the respondent was also present. When he reached near the house of the respondent he was assaulted by the respondent with a lathi blow on his head. On hearing the hue and cry the other villagers got collected and saw the deceased lying on the ground in a pool of blood with a head injury. The respondent along with his mother  and wife  were tending the deceased and wiping the blood. The deceased told the villagers that the respondent had assaulted him. 

ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENT

The respondent stated that during the day time his bell-metal utensils had been stolen and he was keeping a watch for     the thief when he saw a person coming inside his premises and thinking him to be a thief he dealt a lathi blow but subsequently discovered that it was the deceased. The deceased also told his  wife that he had been assaulted by the  respondent in the presence of his son and grandson.

  On appeal the High Court accepted the defense plea and the respondent was protected under Sec.79 of the IPC and acquitted him.

On appeal to the hon’ble Supreme Court

    HELD

 1. The judgment of acquittal entered by the High Court was held to be erroneous and manifest of miscarriage of justice.

2.Under  s. 79 of the IPC although an act may  not  be justified by law, yet if it is done under a mistake of fact, in  the belief of good faith that it is justified by law it will  not be an offence. The question of good faith must be considered with reference to the position of the accused and the circumstances under which he acted.

{ In view of s. 52  of the IPC “good faith” requires not logical infallibility     but due care and attention. The question of good faith is always a question of fact to be determined in accordance with the proved facts and circumstances of each case. It may be laid down as general rule that an alleged offender is deemed to have acted under that state of things which he in good faith and on reasonable grounds believed to exist when he did the act alleged to be an offence. Section 79 is attracted where the circumstances showed that the accused acted under a bona fide belief that he was legally justified in doing the act owing to ignorance of the existence of relevant facts, or mistake as to them. 

    3.But in the present case there was complete absence     of good faith on the part of the respondent. The deceased and the respondent were having strained relations. From the dying declaration as well as the extrajudicial confession it was apparent that the deceased after the recital of Bhagbat had gone near  to the pond  to take the bell-metal utensils. Apparently,  the     respondent  was waiting for an opportunity to settle  the     account  when he struck the deceased with the lathi  blow and there was no occasion for him in the circumstances proved to have  believed that he was striking at a thief. Even  if  he was  a thief, that fact by itself would  not justify the respondent dealing a lathi blow on the head of the deceased. The deceased had not effected an entry into the house nor he was anywhere near it.  It appears that the respondent stealthily followed him and took the opportunity to  settle score by dealing him with lathi with  great force on a vulnerable part of the body like     the  head  which  resulted in his death. There was  no suggestion that he wielded  the lathi in the right of self defense. The respondent, therefore, must face the consequences.  Although it cannot be said from the circumstances appearing that the respondent had any intention to kill the deceased, he must in  the circumstances be attributed with knowledge  when  he struck    the  deceased on the head with a lathi that  it     was likely    to  cause his death.. The evidence on record shows that the respondent and the deceased had strained relations over grazing of cattles. 


According to the High Court, the dying declaration made by the deceased as also the extra-judicial confession made by the respondent showed that the deceased had kept the bell-metal utensil under water in the pond. At the time of occurrence, the deceased had been to the pond to take out the bell-metal utensil. Admittedly, it was a dark night. The defense plea was that the respondent had been apprehensive of further theft of his bell-metal utensils. When he found someone near the pond, he asked who the person was. As there was no response, believing that person to be a thief, he assaulted him but thereafter discovered that it was the deceased. The High Court held that in the circumstances, the respondent had not committed any offence and was protected under s. 79 of the Indian Penal Code. It accepted that the onus to establish the facts to sustain the plea of mistake of fact under s. 79 lay on the respondent and he had to establish his plea of reasonable probability or, in other words, on preponderance of probability either by adducing evidence or by cross-examining the prosecution witnesses. It referred to some cases where different High Courts under the facts and circumstances of the particular case appearing extended the benefit of s. 79 of the Indian Penal Code to the accused where it was proved that the accused had acted under a mistake of fact i.e. an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances which, if proved, would make the act for which the accused is indicted an innocent act.


Section 79 of the Indian Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of mistake of fact and not by reason of mistake of law, in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it. Under this section, although an act may not be justified by law, yet if it is done under a mistake of fact, in the belief in good faith that it is justified by law it will not be an offence. Such cases are not uncommon where the Courts in the facts and circumstances of the particular case have exonerated the accused under s. 79 on the ground of his having acted in good faith under the belief, owing to a mistake of fact that he was justified in doing the act which constituted an offence. As laid down in s. 52 of the Indian Penal Code, nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith which is done or believed without due care and attention. The question of good faith must be considered with reference to the position of the accused and the circumstances under which he acted. 'Good faith' requires not logical infallibility but due care and attention. The question of good faith is always a question of fact to be determined in accordance with the proved facts and circumstances of each case. ‘Mistake’ is not mere forgetfulness. It is a slip ‘made, not by design, but by mischance.

The cases on which the High Court has relied were cases where the circumstances showed that the accused had acted under a bona fide belief that he was legally justified in doing the act owing to ignorance of the existence of relevant facts, or mistake as to them. In Chirangi v. State  where an accused under a moment of delusion, considered that his own son, to whom he was attached, was a tiger and he accordingly assaulted him with an axe, thinking by reason of mistake of fact that he was justified in destroying the deceased whom he did not regard to be a human being but a dangerous ani- mal. It was held that the accused was protected under s. 79 of the Indian Penal Code. 


We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and convict the respondent for having committed an offence punishable under s. 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code. The respondent is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of three years. The bail bonds of the respondent shall stand cancelled and he shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining part of the sentence.




Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Section 58B of The Advocates Act - Special provision relating to certain disciplinary proceedings

 Section 58B The Advocates Act Description (1) As from the 1st day of September, 1963, every proceeding in respect of any disciplinary matter in relation to an existing advocate of a High Court shall, save as provided in the first proviso to sub-section (2), be disposed of by the State Bar Council in relation to that High Court, as if the existing advocate had been enrolled as an advocate on its roll. (2) If immediately before the said date, there is any proceeding in respect of any disciplinary matter in relation to an existing advocate pending before any High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (38 of 1926), such proceeding shall stand transferred to the State Bar Council in relation to that High Court, as if it were a proceeding pending before the corresponding Bar Council under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 56: Provided that where in respect of any such proceeding the High Court has received the finding of a Tribunal constituted under section 11 of the Indian B

Case Laws related to Defamation in favour of ClaimantCase Laws related to Defamation in favour of Claimant. TOLLEY Vs, J.S FRY & SONS LTD – (1931) Facts The defendants were owners of chocolate manufacturing company. They advertised their products with a caricature of the claimant, who was a prominent amateur golfer, showing him with the defendants’ chocolate in his pocket while playing golf. The advertisement compared the excellence of the chocolate to the excellence of the claimant’s drive. The claimant did not consent to or knew about the advertisement. Issue The claimant alleged that the advertisement suggested that he agreed to his portrait being used for commercial purposes and for financial gain. He further claimed that the use of his image made him look like someone who prostituted his reputation for advertising purposes and was thus unworthy of his status. At trial, several golfers gave evidence to the effect that if an amateur sold himself for advertisement, he no longer maintained his amateur status and might be asked to resign from his respective club. Furthermore, there was evidence that the possible adverse effects of the caricature on the claimant’s reputation were brought to the defendants’ attention. The trial judge found that the caricature could have a defamatory meaning. The jury then found in favor of the claimant. Held The House of Lords held that in the circumstances of this case – as explained by the facts – the caricature was capable of constituting defamation. In other words, the publication could have the meaning alleged by the claimant. The Lords also ordered a new trial limited to the assessment of damages. NEWSTEAD V LANDON EXPRESS NEWSPAPER LTD, (1939) Facts: A newspaper published a defamatory article about Harold Newstead. However, another person with this name brought an action in libel. He claimed that the article had been misunderstood as leading to him. The defendant newspaper recognised that they published the article. Also, they denied that they had the intention of being defamatory of him. Consequently, the claimant argued that the newspaper was under a duty. The duty was to give a clear and complete description of the correct person. Moreover, the claimant argued that the defendants were in breach of the duty. Issues: The issue in Newstead v London Express Newspaper, was if the reasonable persons would have understood the words complained of to refer to the plaintiff. Held: The Court of Appeal stated that in accordance with the current law on libel, liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer; but on the fact of the defamation. Accordingly, a reasonable man, in this case a newspaper publisher, must be aware of the possibility of individuals with the same name and must assume that the words published will be read by a reasonable man with reasonable care.

  Case Laws related to Defamation in favour of Claimant.  TOLLEY  Vs,  J.S FRY & SONS LTD – (1931) Facts The defendants were owners of chocolate manufacturing company. They advertised their products with a caricature of the claimant, who was a prominent amateur golfer, showing him with the defendants’ chocolate in his pocket while playing golf. The advertisement compared the excellence of the chocolate to the excellence of the claimant’s drive. The claimant did not consent to or knew about the advertisement.   Issue The claimant alleged that the advertisement suggested that he agreed to his portrait being used for commercial purposes and for financial gain. He further claimed that the use of his image made him look like someone who prostituted his reputation for advertising purposes and was thus unworthy of his status. At trial, several golfers gave evidence to the effect that if an amateur sold himself for advertisement, he no longer maintained his amateur status and might be aske

Rules as to delivery of goods

                             Rules as to delivery of goods Section 2(2) of Sale of Goods Act defines ‘delivery’ as a ‘voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another.’ Thus, if the transfer of goods is not voluntary and is taken by theft, by fraud, or by force, then there is no ‘delivery. Moreover, the ‘delivery’ should have the effect of putting the goods in possession of the buyer. The essence of the delivery is a voluntary transfer of possession of goods from one person to another. There is no delivery of goods where they are obtained at pistol point or theft. 1. Mode of Delivery: According to Section 33, delivery of goods sold may be made by doing anything which the parties agree shall be treated as delivery or which has the effect of putting the goods in the possession of the buyer or of any person authorized to hold them on his behalf. Delivery of goods may be actual, symbolic or constructive. 2. Expenses of Delivery: According to Section 36(5), unless otherwise agree