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Section 58AF of The Advocates Act - Special provisions in relation to Jammu and Kashmir

Section 58AF The Advocates Act Description

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all advocates who, immediately before the date on which the provisions of Chapter III are brought into force in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, were entitled to practise in the High Court of that State, or who would have been so entitled had they not been in public service on the said date, shall, for the purpose of the clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 17, be deemed to be persons who were entered as advocates on the roll of a High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (38 of 1926), and every such person may, on an application made in this behalf within such time as may be specified by the Bar Council of India, be admitted as an advocate on the State roll maintained in respect of the said State.




(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, every person who, immediately before the date on which the provisions of Chapter III are brought into force in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, was entitled otherwise than as an advocate to practise the profession of law (whether by way of pleading or acting or both) by virtue of the provisions of any law in force in the said State, or who would have been so entitled had he not been in public service on the said date, may be admitted as an advocate on the State roll maintained in respect of the said State, if he




(i) makes an application for such enrolment in accordance with the provisions of this Act; and






(ii) fulfils the conditions specified in clauses (a), (b), (e) and (f) of sub-section (1) of section 24.






(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, every person who, immediately before the date on which the provisions of Chapter IV are brought into force in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, was practising the profession of law (whether by way of pleading or acting or both or in any other way) by virtue of the provisions of any law in force therein, or who does not elect to be or is not qualified to be enrolled as an advocate under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), shall, notwithstanding the repeal by this Act of the relevant provisions of such law, continue to enjoy the same rights as respects practice in any Court or revenue office or before any other authority or person and be subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the same authority which he enjoyed, or, as the case may be, to which he was subject, immediately before the said date and accordingly the relevant provisions of the law aforesaid shall have effect in relation to such persons as if they had not been repealed.




(4) On the date on which this Act or any part thereof comes into force in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the law in force in that State which corresponds to this Act or such part thereof which does not stand repealed by virtue of the provisions of section 50 of this Act, shall also stand repealed.

 

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