Skip to main content

“Fundamental Rights of Guilty Members of Unlawful Association”- By Yashika Soni

“Fundamental Rights of Guilty Members of Unlawful Association”- By Yashika Soni

The major case in this area is Apthekar vs Secretary of State. The US Supreme Court ruled in this case that a person's fundamental rights cannot be denied only because he or she is a member of the Communist Party. Furthermore, it was determined that encroaching on fundamental freedoms would not achieve the underlying purpose of ensuring national security. To safeguard the state's security requirements, less extreme measures might be adopted. Cramp vs. Board of Public Instructions reached a similar conclusion. Furthermore, the constitutional bench ruling in Kedar Nath Singh versus State of Bihar by the Supreme Court of India explicitly establishes the application of English and Canadian law in the context of sedition

“A tendency for causing tumult or disturbance is an important feature of sedition under English law... As a result, section 124A must be understood in the same way as sedition is interpreted in England, and a tendency to upset public order must be deemed to be an important part of the offence under s124A. The Canadian Criminal Code's articles 133 and 133A, which deal with sedition, have been accorded the same meaning, 1951, Canadian SCR 265. Tilak's case, 22 Bom 1112, Bhalerao's case, 74 IA 89, and Wallace-Johnson's [1940] AC 231, that encouragement to violence or a desire to disrupt public order was not an essential part of S. 124A, is incorrect. The right opinion is that the tendency to disturb public order is a required component of the crime under § 124A, as stated in 1942 FC R 38. In the instance of Devi Saran, 32 Pat 1124, the same conclusion is reached.”

The actual provocation of violence or disturbance of public order is clearly a vital criterion for establishing a crime in this scenario. This should logically follow in the case of prohibited organisations as well. Finally, in Vogt vs Germany, the European Court of Human Rights held that a language teacher's right to freedom of association and freedom of speech and expression had been infringed when she was sacked only because she was a member of the German Communist Party. It wasn't enough for her to just be a member of this organisation. To summarise, a large body of domestic and international law plainly supports the ruling in Arup Bhuyan versus State of Assam, both in terms of national security and human rights. The central government's attempt to overturn the decision is clearly misguided. 

Also, In the case of Thwaha Fasal vs. UOI, a bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay Oka concluded that when contemplating bail under the UAPA, the court does not need to conduct a mini-trial and should just review the evidence on which the chargesheet was submitted. The trial court had oversimplified the case while granting bail, according to the high court. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, stated that the high court overlooked the fact that the special court had studied all of the evidence and made prima facie conclusions that the accused had no intention of furthering CPI's operations (Maoist). The court therefore overturned the Kerala High Court ruling cancelling Fasal's bail.



Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Section 58B of The Advocates Act - Special provision relating to certain disciplinary proceedings

 Section 58B The Advocates Act Description (1) As from the 1st day of September, 1963, every proceeding in respect of any disciplinary matter in relation to an existing advocate of a High Court shall, save as provided in the first proviso to sub-section (2), be disposed of by the State Bar Council in relation to that High Court, as if the existing advocate had been enrolled as an advocate on its roll. (2) If immediately before the said date, there is any proceeding in respect of any disciplinary matter in relation to an existing advocate pending before any High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (38 of 1926), such proceeding shall stand transferred to the State Bar Council in relation to that High Court, as if it were a proceeding pending before the corresponding Bar Council under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 56: Provided that where in respect of any such proceeding the High Court has received the finding of a Tribunal constituted under section 11 of the Indian B

Case Laws related to Defamation in favour of ClaimantCase Laws related to Defamation in favour of Claimant. TOLLEY Vs, J.S FRY & SONS LTD – (1931) Facts The defendants were owners of chocolate manufacturing company. They advertised their products with a caricature of the claimant, who was a prominent amateur golfer, showing him with the defendants’ chocolate in his pocket while playing golf. The advertisement compared the excellence of the chocolate to the excellence of the claimant’s drive. The claimant did not consent to or knew about the advertisement. Issue The claimant alleged that the advertisement suggested that he agreed to his portrait being used for commercial purposes and for financial gain. He further claimed that the use of his image made him look like someone who prostituted his reputation for advertising purposes and was thus unworthy of his status. At trial, several golfers gave evidence to the effect that if an amateur sold himself for advertisement, he no longer maintained his amateur status and might be asked to resign from his respective club. Furthermore, there was evidence that the possible adverse effects of the caricature on the claimant’s reputation were brought to the defendants’ attention. The trial judge found that the caricature could have a defamatory meaning. The jury then found in favor of the claimant. Held The House of Lords held that in the circumstances of this case – as explained by the facts – the caricature was capable of constituting defamation. In other words, the publication could have the meaning alleged by the claimant. The Lords also ordered a new trial limited to the assessment of damages. NEWSTEAD V LANDON EXPRESS NEWSPAPER LTD, (1939) Facts: A newspaper published a defamatory article about Harold Newstead. However, another person with this name brought an action in libel. He claimed that the article had been misunderstood as leading to him. The defendant newspaper recognised that they published the article. Also, they denied that they had the intention of being defamatory of him. Consequently, the claimant argued that the newspaper was under a duty. The duty was to give a clear and complete description of the correct person. Moreover, the claimant argued that the defendants were in breach of the duty. Issues: The issue in Newstead v London Express Newspaper, was if the reasonable persons would have understood the words complained of to refer to the plaintiff. Held: The Court of Appeal stated that in accordance with the current law on libel, liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer; but on the fact of the defamation. Accordingly, a reasonable man, in this case a newspaper publisher, must be aware of the possibility of individuals with the same name and must assume that the words published will be read by a reasonable man with reasonable care.

  Case Laws related to Defamation in favour of Claimant.  TOLLEY  Vs,  J.S FRY & SONS LTD – (1931) Facts The defendants were owners of chocolate manufacturing company. They advertised their products with a caricature of the claimant, who was a prominent amateur golfer, showing him with the defendants’ chocolate in his pocket while playing golf. The advertisement compared the excellence of the chocolate to the excellence of the claimant’s drive. The claimant did not consent to or knew about the advertisement.   Issue The claimant alleged that the advertisement suggested that he agreed to his portrait being used for commercial purposes and for financial gain. He further claimed that the use of his image made him look like someone who prostituted his reputation for advertising purposes and was thus unworthy of his status. At trial, several golfers gave evidence to the effect that if an amateur sold himself for advertisement, he no longer maintained his amateur status and might be aske

Rules as to delivery of goods

                             Rules as to delivery of goods Section 2(2) of Sale of Goods Act defines ‘delivery’ as a ‘voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another.’ Thus, if the transfer of goods is not voluntary and is taken by theft, by fraud, or by force, then there is no ‘delivery. Moreover, the ‘delivery’ should have the effect of putting the goods in possession of the buyer. The essence of the delivery is a voluntary transfer of possession of goods from one person to another. There is no delivery of goods where they are obtained at pistol point or theft. 1. Mode of Delivery: According to Section 33, delivery of goods sold may be made by doing anything which the parties agree shall be treated as delivery or which has the effect of putting the goods in the possession of the buyer or of any person authorized to hold them on his behalf. Delivery of goods may be actual, symbolic or constructive. 2. Expenses of Delivery: According to Section 36(5), unless otherwise agree