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Irretrievable breakdown of marriage

 Irretrievable Breakdown of marriage

Shreya Verma

Matrimonial matters are the matters of delicate human and emotional relationship. It demands mutual trust, regard, respect, love and affection with sufficiently for reasonable adjustment of the spouse. The relationship has to conform to the social norms as well. The matrimonial conduct has now come to be governed by statute framed, keeping in view such norms and changed social order. It is sought to be controlled in the interest of individuals as well as in broad perspective, for regulating matrimonial norms for making of a well-knit, healthy and not a disturbed and porous society this was the view of the Supreme court in the case of, Chetan Das v. Kamla Devi (2001).

In this case it was submitted that irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not in itself ground for divorce, though it may well be a factor to be borne in mind when a case is decided.

One of the grounds for getting a degree for annulment of marriage on the reasons of irretrievable big breakdown is that the party who is seeking for the dissolution of marriage must do equity as in the case of Chetan Das, The party seeking to divorce was found in the court of judicial proceeding to have committed a matrimonial offense that is adultery a decree of divorce on the grounds of retrievable breakdown of marriage was not granted on the basis that the airing party cannot be permitted to break a marital bond by taking advantage of his own wrong. ‘Irretrievable breakdown of marriage' is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act and Special Marriages Act, the Supreme Court has, in a significant ruling, said divorce can be granted if a marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead and beyond salvage. The supreme court in Naveen Kohli vs. Neetu Kohli (2006) Made an observation that mutual consent and irretrievable breakdown should not to be read together. The good also in this case requested the union ministry to introduce irretrievable breakdown as the ground for divorce. In the case of Anil Kumar Jain vs. Maya Jain (2009) The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of irretrievable breakdown was not available to high court which do not have powers similar to those exercised by the Supreme Court under article 124. 

The fault theory of divorce requires that there was a specific ground or a fault on the part of one of the parties to marriage which would form a ground for divorce. But in case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, there is no specific ground rather there are multiple grounds that enable the parties not to live together anymore. In Amandeep vs Harleen Kaur (2017) SC, the division bench of the Apex court, headed by Adarsh Kumar Goel J. Supreme Court its power to grant divorce on the basis of irretrievable breakdown of marriage from Article 124 to the Constitution however the high court and trial court can also grant divorce for irretrievable breakdown under the provisions of section 13B that too only if irretrievable breakdown as proved.

The Supreme Court holds an opinion that the institution of marriage occupies an important place and role to play in society, in general. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to apply any submission of ‘irretrievably broken marriage’ as a straitjacket formula for grant of relief of divorce. This aspect has to be considered in the background of other facts and circumstances of the case.


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