Skip to main content

Daughter's right to property

 DAUGHTER’S RIGHT TO PROPERTY

At the time of the Hindu succession act's enactment in 1956, legislators did not see the need to grant daughters rights to the father's ancestral property. It was thought at the time that after her marriage, the daughter would be part of another family and would not be entitled to inherit her father's coparcenary property.

In today's world, your gender as a woman has little bearing on your property rights. As a result, the property rights of daughters are nearly identical to those of sons.

A daughter has the same right as any other man to acquire, hold, and dispose of the property. There are almost no restrictions on a woman's ability to acquire, hold, and dispose of her property today. Daughters are entitled to an equal share of their father's self-acquired as well as ancestral property. Daughters have become coparceners as a result of the 2005 Supreme Court decision. As a result, they have equal ownership of all property, including agricultural lands. Both men and women are capable of owning their own, distinct property. Any restrictions on property rights apply equally to both sexes.

Who is Coparcener?

Coparcener is the person who has had legal ownership of ancestral property since birth. It denotes the equality of title, possession, and interest. A coparcenary property is one that any Hindu inherits from his father, grandfather, and great grandfather. Prior to 2005, the coparcener only included sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons who were joint family holders.

Daughter’s Right to property after 2005

After approximately 50 years, the centre passed the 2005 amendment act to address gender discrimination in coparcenary property. Previously, women were not considered coparceners to inherit ancestral property from birth, as sons were. Section 6 of the act, which deals with coparceners' rights in Hindu undivided family property, was amended. The 2005 amendment act repealed the survivorship rule and replaced it with testamentary and intestate succession.

Daughters have the same right as sons to become coparceners and to request a Hindu Undivided family partition. She also has the right to dispose of her share of coparcenary property at her leisure. Daughters were identified as coparceners from birth. Similarly, the son and daughter will bear equal responsibility.

Married daughter’s right to property under Hindu succession Act

Under the Hindu Succession Act, a married daughter has the right to property.

After marriage, the daughter will remain a coparcener but will no longer be a member of our parents' Hindu undivided family. She has the right to request partition, and he can become a Karta of HUF only if she is the eldest coparcener of her father's HUF. Following the death of a married daughter, her child is entitled to her share. Importantly, the daughter does not have the right to gift her share of the HUF property while she is alive, but she can do so through a will. Her share will be automatically transferred over to her legal heirs the death of the married daughter.


Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, a recent case (2020) A three-judge bench led by Justice A.K. Sikri ruled that the daughters are entitled to equal property rights even if they were not born at the time of the 2005 amendment to the Hindu succession act, 1956, and even if the father died before the amendment act went into effect.

According to Justice Mishra: Regardless of whether her father is alive or not, the daughter will remain a loving daughter for the rest of her life, and they will remain a coparcener for the rest of their lives.

The Supreme Court ruled that the 2005 amendment had retroactive effect, conferring rights on daughters who were alive at the time of the amendment, even if they were born prior to it.

As a result of the recent ruling, the 2005 Amendment Act has been declared retrospective, and daughters are now granted equal rights to ancestral property even if the father died before September 9th, 2005. A woman will have an equal share of the undivided family property whether her father was alive when the law was amended in 2005 or not, with the law having retroactive effect.


Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Section 58B of The Advocates Act - Special provision relating to certain disciplinary proceedings

 Section 58B The Advocates Act Description (1) As from the 1st day of September, 1963, every proceeding in respect of any disciplinary matter in relation to an existing advocate of a High Court shall, save as provided in the first proviso to sub-section (2), be disposed of by the State Bar Council in relation to that High Court, as if the existing advocate had been enrolled as an advocate on its roll. (2) If immediately before the said date, there is any proceeding in respect of any disciplinary matter in relation to an existing advocate pending before any High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (38 of 1926), such proceeding shall stand transferred to the State Bar Council in relation to that High Court, as if it were a proceeding pending before the corresponding Bar Council under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 56: Provided that where in respect of any such proceeding the High Court has received the finding of a Tribunal constituted under section 11 of the Indian B

Case Laws related to Defamation in favour of ClaimantCase Laws related to Defamation in favour of Claimant. TOLLEY Vs, J.S FRY & SONS LTD – (1931) Facts The defendants were owners of chocolate manufacturing company. They advertised their products with a caricature of the claimant, who was a prominent amateur golfer, showing him with the defendants’ chocolate in his pocket while playing golf. The advertisement compared the excellence of the chocolate to the excellence of the claimant’s drive. The claimant did not consent to or knew about the advertisement. Issue The claimant alleged that the advertisement suggested that he agreed to his portrait being used for commercial purposes and for financial gain. He further claimed that the use of his image made him look like someone who prostituted his reputation for advertising purposes and was thus unworthy of his status. At trial, several golfers gave evidence to the effect that if an amateur sold himself for advertisement, he no longer maintained his amateur status and might be asked to resign from his respective club. Furthermore, there was evidence that the possible adverse effects of the caricature on the claimant’s reputation were brought to the defendants’ attention. The trial judge found that the caricature could have a defamatory meaning. The jury then found in favor of the claimant. Held The House of Lords held that in the circumstances of this case – as explained by the facts – the caricature was capable of constituting defamation. In other words, the publication could have the meaning alleged by the claimant. The Lords also ordered a new trial limited to the assessment of damages. NEWSTEAD V LANDON EXPRESS NEWSPAPER LTD, (1939) Facts: A newspaper published a defamatory article about Harold Newstead. However, another person with this name brought an action in libel. He claimed that the article had been misunderstood as leading to him. The defendant newspaper recognised that they published the article. Also, they denied that they had the intention of being defamatory of him. Consequently, the claimant argued that the newspaper was under a duty. The duty was to give a clear and complete description of the correct person. Moreover, the claimant argued that the defendants were in breach of the duty. Issues: The issue in Newstead v London Express Newspaper, was if the reasonable persons would have understood the words complained of to refer to the plaintiff. Held: The Court of Appeal stated that in accordance with the current law on libel, liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer; but on the fact of the defamation. Accordingly, a reasonable man, in this case a newspaper publisher, must be aware of the possibility of individuals with the same name and must assume that the words published will be read by a reasonable man with reasonable care.

  Case Laws related to Defamation in favour of Claimant.  TOLLEY  Vs,  J.S FRY & SONS LTD – (1931) Facts The defendants were owners of chocolate manufacturing company. They advertised their products with a caricature of the claimant, who was a prominent amateur golfer, showing him with the defendants’ chocolate in his pocket while playing golf. The advertisement compared the excellence of the chocolate to the excellence of the claimant’s drive. The claimant did not consent to or knew about the advertisement.   Issue The claimant alleged that the advertisement suggested that he agreed to his portrait being used for commercial purposes and for financial gain. He further claimed that the use of his image made him look like someone who prostituted his reputation for advertising purposes and was thus unworthy of his status. At trial, several golfers gave evidence to the effect that if an amateur sold himself for advertisement, he no longer maintained his amateur status and might be aske

Rules as to delivery of goods

                             Rules as to delivery of goods Section 2(2) of Sale of Goods Act defines ‘delivery’ as a ‘voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another.’ Thus, if the transfer of goods is not voluntary and is taken by theft, by fraud, or by force, then there is no ‘delivery. Moreover, the ‘delivery’ should have the effect of putting the goods in possession of the buyer. The essence of the delivery is a voluntary transfer of possession of goods from one person to another. There is no delivery of goods where they are obtained at pistol point or theft. 1. Mode of Delivery: According to Section 33, delivery of goods sold may be made by doing anything which the parties agree shall be treated as delivery or which has the effect of putting the goods in the possession of the buyer or of any person authorized to hold them on his behalf. Delivery of goods may be actual, symbolic or constructive. 2. Expenses of Delivery: According to Section 36(5), unless otherwise agree