Skip to main content

GENERAL DEFENCES UNDER TORTS

                      GENERAL DEFENCE UNDER LAW OF TORTS 






WHAT ARE GENERAL DEFENCE ?


THE GENERAL DEFENSES ARE BASICALLY A SET OF DEFENSES THAT HAVE ARISEN OVER TIME AND HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY THE COURTS FROM TIME TO TIME WHICH MAY BE REGARDED AS EXCUSES TO EVADE SENTENCING AS LONG AS THE DEFENDANT'S ACTION FITS THE RELEVANT TERMS AND CONDITIONS. SELF-DEFENSE RESPECTIVELY. THERE ARE OTHER FORMS OF SELF-DEFENSE THAT ARE PARTICULARLY ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAIN CASES, SUCH AS DEFAMATION, PROTECTION OF THE TRUTH, RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT COMMENTS, WHILE THERE ARE OTHER PROTECTIONS THAT CAN BE APPLIED TO ALL OR MOST OF A CASE SUCH AS THE CONSENT AND ERROR OF A THIRD PARTY. .


SOME OF THE MOST COMMON DEFENSES IN THE HARASSMENT ACT ARE AS FOLLOWS:


VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA I.E. PERMISSION

PLAINTIFF IS THE WRONG DOER 

INEVITABLE ACCIDENT

AN ACT OF GOD

PRIVACY PROTECTION

NECESSITY 

LEGAL AUTHORITY

VOLENT NON FIT INJURIA (PERMISSION)


THE LATIN PHRASE VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA MEANS A PERSON WHO IS WILLING TO SUFFER AND GIVE PERMISSION FOR THE SUFFERING AND INJURY CAUSED BY THE ACTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT AND CANNOT COMPLAIN ABOUT SUCH HARM TO HIS OR HER LEGAL RIGHTS. IN THE EVENT THAT THE PLAINTIFF, WITH HIS OR HER OWN CONSENT TO THE INJURY, IS UNABLE TO HOLD THE DEFENDANT LIABLE FOR SUCH INJURY AND THE DEFENDANT MAY USE THE DEFENSE OF THE VOLENT NON FIT INJURIA TO BE EXEMPT FROM ANY LIABILITY THAT MAY ARISE. THE RATIONALE FOR THIS DEFENSE IS THAT THE PERSON CANNOT DELIBERATELY ENFORCE SUCH RIGHTS WHICH HE OR SHE HAS DELIBERATELY AND WITH HIS OR HER CONSENT BEEN GRANTED. SUCH INTENTIONAL CONSENT MAY BE SUBJECT TO EXPLICIT OR IMPLIED TERMS.


IN THE CASE OF HALL V. BROOKLANDS AUTO RACING CLUB THERE WAS A CAR RACE GOING ON AND THE PLAINTIFF WAS A SPECTATOR OF THAT RACE RUNNING ON THE DEFENDANT'S TRAIL. TWO VEHICLES COLLIDED, ONE OF WHICH SWERVED TOWARDS THE SPECTATORS, INJURING THE COMPLAINANT. IN THE ACTION BROUGHT BY HIM, THE COURT SAID THAT THERE WERE PLAINTIFFS WHO DELIBERATELY CONSENTED AND DELIBERATELY RISKED WATCHING THE EVENT WHERE SUCH INJURIES COULD BE SEEN AND THE DEFENDANT WAS INNOCENT.

PLAINTIFF IS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE ERROR


THE LATIN WORD MAXIM ‘EX TURPI CAUSA NON ORITUR ACTIO’ MEANS ‘FROM IMMORALITY, NO ACTION ARISES’. THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN ACQUITTED OF THE CHARGES AGAINST WHICH THE PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IS UNLAWFUL OR UNLAWFUL. IN THESE CASES, THE PLAINTIFF IS UNABLE TO SEEK LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN COURT AS HE IS ALSO AT FAULT INITIALLY AND HIS ACTIONS LED TO HIS LEGAL INJURY.


 IN THE CASE OF PITTS V. HUNT , AN 18-YEAR-OLD PASSENGER ENCOURAGED HIS 16-YEAR-OLD FRIEND BY SPEEDING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. THE CAR WAS INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT AND A YOUNG BOY WAS KILLED AND AN OLDER MAN WAS INJURED. THE COURT REJECTED THE CLAIM AS THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE IS THE PERPETRATOR AND THE DEFENDANT CAN USE THIS DEFENSE TO EVADE PROSECUTION.


INEVITABLE DANGER


ACCIDENT MEANS UNFORESEEN INJURY AND IF SUCH AN ACCIDENT IS OF A PREVENTABLE NATURE IN SPITE OF ALL THE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AND PRECAUTIONS THAT CAN BE TAKEN BY THE DEFENDANT, THEN IT IS KNOWN AS THE PREVENTABLE ACCIDENT WHICH SERVES AS A PROTECTION AGAINST THE ACCIDENT. DEFENDANT TO FREE HIMSELF FROM ANY OBLIGATION. 


IN THE CASE OF STANLEY V. POWELL , BOTH OF THEM WENT ON TO BE SHOT IN THE HEAD WHEN THE DEFENDANT FIRED A SHOT AT THE PHIASANT. HOWEVER, A BULLET WAS FOUND IN AN OAK TREE AND STRUCK THE COMPLAINANT, CAUSING HIM SERIOUS INJURIES. IN THE ACTION BROUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, THE COURT HELD THAT THE INCIDENT WAS INESCAPABLE AND THAT THE DEFENDANT COULD BE ACQUITTED OF ANY KIND OF OFFENSE.


ACTION OF GOD / VIS MAJOR


GOD'S ACTION SERVES AS A FINE PROTECTION FROM THE LAW OF TORT. DEFENDING THE ACT OF GOD STILL APPLIES EVEN WHEN COMPARED TO THE STRICT LIABILITY LAW THAT EMERGED FROM THE CASE OF RYLANDS V. FLETCHER . THE DEFENSE OF ACT OF GOD FINDS ITS APPLICATION IN THOSE CASES WHERE AN INCIDENT OCCURS THE DEFENDANT IS OUT OF CONTROL AND THE RESULTING DAMAGE IS DUE TO NATURAL FORCES. 


THERE ARE TWO IMPORTANT TYPES OF GOD'S ACTION:


1. NATURAL FORCES MUST WORK:


IN RALINGA NADAR V. NARAYAN REDDIAR , AN UNRULY MOB LOOTED EVERYTHING FROM THE COMPLAINANT'S TRUCK. IN THE ACTION BROUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFF, THE COURT FOUND THAT THE DEFENSE OF GOD'S LAW COULD NOT BE TAKEN AND THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE COMPENSATED.


PRIVATE DEFENCE 


THE LAW GIVES EVERYONE THE RIGHT TO PROTECT THEIR HEALTH AND PROPERTY AND EXTENDS TO THE WHOLE LIFE OF OTHER PEOPLE AND PROPERTY. THE HARASSMENT ACT RECOGNIZES THIS RIGHT AND ANY ACTION ON THE PART OF THE PERSON EXERCISING THIS RIGHT IS DEEMED NOT TO BE THE CAUSE OF ANY VIOLATION OF THE LEGAL OBLIGATION. THE FOLLOWING ARE TWO IMPORTANT FACTORS IN THIS DEFENSE:


1. THERE MUST BE A REAL AND IMMEDIATE THREAT TO HEALTH OR PROPERTY.


2. POWER IS USED ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROTECTION AND NOT FOR RETALIATION.


3. THE ENERGY USED SHOULD BE EQUAL TO THE THREAT.


NECESSITY


THE GENERAL DEFENCE OF NECESSITY PROVIDE THE DEFENDANT WITH THE PRIVILEGE TO GIVE RISE TO LEGAL INJURY TO THE PLAINTIFF IN IN ORDER TO AVOID GREATER HARM. AS PER THIS DEFENCE, IF AN ACT IS INTENTIONALLY DONE RESULTING IN LEGAL INJURY TO ANOTHER PERSON IN ORDER TO PREVENT GREATER HARM, THE DEFENDANT WOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE.


IN CASE OF LEIGH V. GLADSTONE , THE COURT OBSERVED THAT FORCIBLY FEEDING A PERSON WHO IS ON HUNGER STRIKE IN PRISON AMOUNTS TO NECESSITY AND THE DEFENDANT CANNOT BE MADE LIABLE FOR BATTERY.


STATUTORY AUTHORITY:


AN ACT WHICH IS AUTHORISED BY THE ACT OR STATUTES PASSED BY CONCERNED AUTHORITIES DOES NOT BECOME ACTIONABLE EVEN THOUGH OTHERWISE IT WOULD AMOUNT TO TORT. IT SERVES AS A TOTAL DEFENCE FROM LIABILITY . IN THE CASE OF VAUGHAN V. TAFF VALDE RAIL CO. THE SPARKS FROM THE RAILWAY ENGINE OF DEFENDANT’S COMPANY AUTHORISED, SET FIRE THE WOODS OF PLAINTIFF IN THE ADJOINING LAND. SINCE THE AUTHORITY WAS PROVIDED UNDER STATUTE, THE DEFENDANT WAS HELD NOT TO BE HAVING ANY LIABILITY TORT AS THE DEFENCE OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY .


Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Section 58B of The Advocates Act - Special provision relating to certain disciplinary proceedings

 Section 58B The Advocates Act Description (1) As from the 1st day of September, 1963, every proceeding in respect of any disciplinary matter in relation to an existing advocate of a High Court shall, save as provided in the first proviso to sub-section (2), be disposed of by the State Bar Council in relation to that High Court, as if the existing advocate had been enrolled as an advocate on its roll. (2) If immediately before the said date, there is any proceeding in respect of any disciplinary matter in relation to an existing advocate pending before any High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (38 of 1926), such proceeding shall stand transferred to the State Bar Council in relation to that High Court, as if it were a proceeding pending before the corresponding Bar Council under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 56: Provided that where in respect of any such proceeding the High Court has received the finding of a Tribunal constituted under section 11 of the Indian B

Case Laws related to Defamation in favour of ClaimantCase Laws related to Defamation in favour of Claimant. TOLLEY Vs, J.S FRY & SONS LTD – (1931) Facts The defendants were owners of chocolate manufacturing company. They advertised their products with a caricature of the claimant, who was a prominent amateur golfer, showing him with the defendants’ chocolate in his pocket while playing golf. The advertisement compared the excellence of the chocolate to the excellence of the claimant’s drive. The claimant did not consent to or knew about the advertisement. Issue The claimant alleged that the advertisement suggested that he agreed to his portrait being used for commercial purposes and for financial gain. He further claimed that the use of his image made him look like someone who prostituted his reputation for advertising purposes and was thus unworthy of his status. At trial, several golfers gave evidence to the effect that if an amateur sold himself for advertisement, he no longer maintained his amateur status and might be asked to resign from his respective club. Furthermore, there was evidence that the possible adverse effects of the caricature on the claimant’s reputation were brought to the defendants’ attention. The trial judge found that the caricature could have a defamatory meaning. The jury then found in favor of the claimant. Held The House of Lords held that in the circumstances of this case – as explained by the facts – the caricature was capable of constituting defamation. In other words, the publication could have the meaning alleged by the claimant. The Lords also ordered a new trial limited to the assessment of damages. NEWSTEAD V LANDON EXPRESS NEWSPAPER LTD, (1939) Facts: A newspaper published a defamatory article about Harold Newstead. However, another person with this name brought an action in libel. He claimed that the article had been misunderstood as leading to him. The defendant newspaper recognised that they published the article. Also, they denied that they had the intention of being defamatory of him. Consequently, the claimant argued that the newspaper was under a duty. The duty was to give a clear and complete description of the correct person. Moreover, the claimant argued that the defendants were in breach of the duty. Issues: The issue in Newstead v London Express Newspaper, was if the reasonable persons would have understood the words complained of to refer to the plaintiff. Held: The Court of Appeal stated that in accordance with the current law on libel, liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer; but on the fact of the defamation. Accordingly, a reasonable man, in this case a newspaper publisher, must be aware of the possibility of individuals with the same name and must assume that the words published will be read by a reasonable man with reasonable care.

  Case Laws related to Defamation in favour of Claimant.  TOLLEY  Vs,  J.S FRY & SONS LTD – (1931) Facts The defendants were owners of chocolate manufacturing company. They advertised their products with a caricature of the claimant, who was a prominent amateur golfer, showing him with the defendants’ chocolate in his pocket while playing golf. The advertisement compared the excellence of the chocolate to the excellence of the claimant’s drive. The claimant did not consent to or knew about the advertisement.   Issue The claimant alleged that the advertisement suggested that he agreed to his portrait being used for commercial purposes and for financial gain. He further claimed that the use of his image made him look like someone who prostituted his reputation for advertising purposes and was thus unworthy of his status. At trial, several golfers gave evidence to the effect that if an amateur sold himself for advertisement, he no longer maintained his amateur status and might be aske

Rules as to delivery of goods

                             Rules as to delivery of goods Section 2(2) of Sale of Goods Act defines ‘delivery’ as a ‘voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another.’ Thus, if the transfer of goods is not voluntary and is taken by theft, by fraud, or by force, then there is no ‘delivery. Moreover, the ‘delivery’ should have the effect of putting the goods in possession of the buyer. The essence of the delivery is a voluntary transfer of possession of goods from one person to another. There is no delivery of goods where they are obtained at pistol point or theft. 1. Mode of Delivery: According to Section 33, delivery of goods sold may be made by doing anything which the parties agree shall be treated as delivery or which has the effect of putting the goods in the possession of the buyer or of any person authorized to hold them on his behalf. Delivery of goods may be actual, symbolic or constructive. 2. Expenses of Delivery: According to Section 36(5), unless otherwise agree