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JORAWAR SINGH MUNDY VS. UNION OF INDIA (2021)

 


                     JORAWAR SINGH MUNDY VS. UNION OF INDIA (2021)


INTRODUCTION

This is the case where the right to be forgotten is discussed. In this case the main issue was that is the right to be forgotten a fundamental right or not, is it comes under Article 21 of the constitution. Right to forgotten means, it is the right to have publicly available personal information removed for all sources.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, an American resident, had visited India in 2009. Nonetheless, a body of evidence was recorded against him under the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985. After several years, a preliminary court acquitted him in its decision dated April 30, 2011. In a decision dated January 29, 2013, a solitary adjudicator of the Delhi High Court insisted his acquittal on appeal by the state. Subsequent to getting back to the United States, the petitioner concentrated on regulation and understood that he was in a tough spot in light of the fact that the High Court's choice was accessible on the web. Subtleties of his case could be found through a google search by any potential business who needed to run a historical verification on him prior to employing. In this way, he sent notification to Google India Private Ltd., Google LLC, Indian Kanoon, and vLex.in. However, just vLex.in pulled out the previously mentioned decision from its entrance. At the point when the judgment was not removed from different stages, he recorded a writ appeal under the steady gaze of the Delhi High Court, mentioning that the judgment be erased from all respondent destinations, regarding the Petitioner's Right to Privacy under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

ISSUES IN THE CASE

1) Whether a court order can be removed from online platforms?

2) Does the concept of the Right to be forgotten exist in India?

JUDGEMENT

The Delhi High court said that on one hand we have petitioners right to privacy and the other hand public’s Right to information and preservation of transparency in judicial records. The court put together its choice with respect to the Supreme Court's choice in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Association of India (2017), which perceived the right to security. It additionally depended on its own request in Zulfiqar Ahman Khan v. Quintillion Businessman Media Pvt. Ltd. and Ors [2021]. The court had passed a break request for this situation to preclude republication of the upbraided article.

Further, the Orissa High Court had likewise perceived the option to be forgotten in Subhranshu Rout v. State of Odisha, [2020]. The court had analysed the viewpoints and immaterialness of the option to be forgotten qua the right to protection, remembering the worldwide regulation for the subject.

Subsequently, the court allowed break assurance to the petitioner and requested substances facilitating the judgment to eliminate it. Indian Kanoon was requested to keep the previously mentioned judgment from being seen via web indexes like Google, Yahoo, and others until the following hearing date.

CONCLUSION

The Right to be forgotten falls under the purview of an individual’s right to privacy, which is governed by the Personal Data Protection Bill that is yet to be passed by parliament. But the stance on whether this right is fundamental in India is still not clear but if the pending Data Protection Bill is cleared it can become a right. But till not the right to be Forgotten is not a fundamental right or it does not comes under Article 21 of the constitution. This the first case in which a court ordered the removal of access to its complete final judgement from certain spaces. 


By,

Asha Sebastian.



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