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Section 100 CPC - Code of Civil Procedure - Second appeal.

 Section 100 CPC Description

1[100. Second appeal


(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.


(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed exparte.


(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.


(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.


(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question :


Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.]


COMMENTS


(i) The scope of exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court in second appeal under section 100 is limited to the substantial question of law. To be a substantial question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent and answer to the same will have a material bearing as to the rights of parties before the Court; Govindaraja v. Mariamman, AIR 2005 SC 1008.


(ii) The High Court was not justified in setting aside the concurrent finding of fact on sub-letting and nuisance without formulating any substantial question of law; Hari Singh v. Kanhaiya Lal, AIR 1999 SC 3325.


(iii) The High Court, in second appeal is not justified in setting aside a mixed question of law and fact; Ram Kumar Agarwal v. Thawar Dass (dead) by LR, AIR 1999 SC 3248.


(iv) The High Court, should not interfere with the concurrent finding of fact in a routine and casual manner by substituting its subjective satisfaction in place of lower courts; Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-un-Niswan, AIR 1999 SC 3067.


(v) Where the first appellate court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in second appeal, treating as substantial question of law; Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, AIR 1999 SC 2213.


(vi) The findings of fact arrived by the courts below are binding in second appeal; Smt. Bismillah Begum (dead) by LRs v. Rahmatullah Khan (dead) by LRs, AIR 1998 SC 970.


(vii) Conclusion about limitation is a finding of fact and is not open for interference in the second appeal; Smt. Saraswatidevi v. Krishnaram Baldeo Bank Limited, AIR 1998 MP 73.


(viii) Once the evidence on which the courts of fact have acted was admissible and relevant, party cannot be allowed to raise that said evidence is insufficient to justify the finding of facts in second appeal; Ramanuja Naidu v. Kanniah Naidu, JT 1996(3) SC 164.


(ix) Second Appeal?Interference with the factual finding is permissible only if the said finding is unreasonable; Sadhu Mehar v. Rajkumar Patel, AIR 1994 Ori 26.


(x) Second Appeal?Interference with factual findings recorded by the court below is permissible in cases of non?consideration of relevant evidence; Nalini v. Padmanabhan Krishnan, AIR 1994 Ker 14.


(xi) Question of fact can not be allowed to be raised in second appeal; Prabhu Dayal v. Suwa Lal, AIR 1994 Raj 149.


(xii) Interference with finding of fact is permissible if the court below ignored weight of evidence on record altogether; Ajab Singh v. Shital Puri, AIR 1993 All 138: 1993 All LJ 548.


(xiii) Erroneous application of law?Second appeal is maintainable If it raises a substantial question; Ratanlal Bansilal v. Kishorilal Goenka, AIR 1993 Cal 144: 1993(1) Cal HN 307: 1993 (1) Cal LJ 193.


(xiv) Interpretation of the contract involves a substantial question of law. It can be examined in second appeal; Smt. Vidya Wati through her LRs. v. Hans Raj through his L.Rs., AIR 1993 Del 187: 1993 Rajdhani LR 274.


(xv) Perverse finding recorded by the court below?Second appeal is maintainable; Ratanlal Bansilal v. Kishorilal Goenka, AIR 1993 Cal 144: 1993 (1) Cal HN 307: 1993 (1) Cal LJ 193.


(xvi) Factual finding based on no evidence?Second appeal is maintainable; Ratanlal Bansilal v. Kishorilal Goenka, AIR 1993 Cal 144: 1993 (1) Cal HN 307: 1993(1) Cal LJ 193.


(xvii) Finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court cannot be interfered with in second appeal unless perverse; Padmashree S.N. Swamy v. Smt. Gowramma, AIR 1993 Kant 208: 1992 (3) Kant LJ 244: 1993 (2) APLJ 18.


(xviii) Finding of fact cannot be questioned in second appeal; Ramaswamy Kalingaryar v. Mathayan Padayachi, AIR 1992 SC 115.


(xix) In absence of substantial question of law on current finding of facts it cannot be interfered with in second appeal; Kehar Singh v. Yash Pal, AIR 1990 SC 2212.


1. Subs, by Act No. 104 of 1976, sec. 37 for Section 100 (w.e.f. 1-2-1977).

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