Skip to main content

Contracts with Pardanashin Women

            Contracts with pardanashin woman

A contract with a pardanashin woman is presumed to have been induced by undue influence. She can avoid the contract unless the other party can show that it was her “intelligent and voluntary act”. There is, however, no statutory or judicial definition of the term “pardanashin woman” . In the opinion of the Bombay High Court a woman does not become pardanashin simply because “she lives in some degree of seclusion”. The concept probably means a woman who is totally secluded from ordinary social intercourse. The following observation of the Privy Council explains the concept to a certain extent. It is absolutely clear that Mrs Hodges was not a pardanashin woman. The term quasi - pardanashin seems to have been invented for the occasion. Their lordships take it to mean a woman, who not being of the pardanashin class, is yet so close to them in kinship in habits, and so secluded from ordinary social intercourse, that a like amount of incapacity for business should be described to her and the same amount of protection which the law gives to pardanashin women must be extended to her. The contention is a novel one and their lordships are not favourably impressed by it. As to a certain well known and easily ascertained class of women, well known rules of law are established with the wisdom of which we are now concerned ; outside that class it much depends in each case on the character and are not bound to take special precautions that her action shall be intelligent and voluntarily and to provide it was so in case of dispute. 

In a case before the Bombay High Court :

It was found that a lady appeared before the registrar for registration of certain documents, which she stood as a witness in the box in a suit, which she put in tenants and fixed and recovered rents from them in respect of her house. The court held that she could not be treated as a pardanashin lady.

Once it is shown that a contract is made with a pardanashin woman, the law presumes undue influence. The burden lies on the other party to show that no undue influence was used, that the contract was fully explained to her and that she freely consented. The following statement of the Privy Council in Kalibaksh Singh versus Ram Gopal Singh explains the extent of this onus : In the first place the lady was a pardanashin lady and the law throws around her a special cloack of protection. It demands that the burden of proof shall in such a case rest not with those who attack but those who found upon the deed and the proof must go so far as to show affirmatively  and conclusively that the deed was not only executed by, but was explained to, and was really understood by, the grantor. In such case, it must also, of course, be established that the deed was not signed under duress, but arose from the free and independent will of the grantor.  


Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Section 58B of The Advocates Act - Special provision relating to certain disciplinary proceedings

 Section 58B The Advocates Act Description (1) As from the 1st day of September, 1963, every proceeding in respect of any disciplinary matter in relation to an existing advocate of a High Court shall, save as provided in the first proviso to sub-section (2), be disposed of by the State Bar Council in relation to that High Court, as if the existing advocate had been enrolled as an advocate on its roll. (2) If immediately before the said date, there is any proceeding in respect of any disciplinary matter in relation to an existing advocate pending before any High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (38 of 1926), such proceeding shall stand transferred to the State Bar Council in relation to that High Court, as if it were a proceeding pending before the corresponding Bar Council under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 56: Provided that where in respect of any such proceeding the High Court has received the finding of a Tribunal constituted under section 11 of the Indian B

Case Laws related to Defamation in favour of ClaimantCase Laws related to Defamation in favour of Claimant. TOLLEY Vs, J.S FRY & SONS LTD – (1931) Facts The defendants were owners of chocolate manufacturing company. They advertised their products with a caricature of the claimant, who was a prominent amateur golfer, showing him with the defendants’ chocolate in his pocket while playing golf. The advertisement compared the excellence of the chocolate to the excellence of the claimant’s drive. The claimant did not consent to or knew about the advertisement. Issue The claimant alleged that the advertisement suggested that he agreed to his portrait being used for commercial purposes and for financial gain. He further claimed that the use of his image made him look like someone who prostituted his reputation for advertising purposes and was thus unworthy of his status. At trial, several golfers gave evidence to the effect that if an amateur sold himself for advertisement, he no longer maintained his amateur status and might be asked to resign from his respective club. Furthermore, there was evidence that the possible adverse effects of the caricature on the claimant’s reputation were brought to the defendants’ attention. The trial judge found that the caricature could have a defamatory meaning. The jury then found in favor of the claimant. Held The House of Lords held that in the circumstances of this case – as explained by the facts – the caricature was capable of constituting defamation. In other words, the publication could have the meaning alleged by the claimant. The Lords also ordered a new trial limited to the assessment of damages. NEWSTEAD V LANDON EXPRESS NEWSPAPER LTD, (1939) Facts: A newspaper published a defamatory article about Harold Newstead. However, another person with this name brought an action in libel. He claimed that the article had been misunderstood as leading to him. The defendant newspaper recognised that they published the article. Also, they denied that they had the intention of being defamatory of him. Consequently, the claimant argued that the newspaper was under a duty. The duty was to give a clear and complete description of the correct person. Moreover, the claimant argued that the defendants were in breach of the duty. Issues: The issue in Newstead v London Express Newspaper, was if the reasonable persons would have understood the words complained of to refer to the plaintiff. Held: The Court of Appeal stated that in accordance with the current law on libel, liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer; but on the fact of the defamation. Accordingly, a reasonable man, in this case a newspaper publisher, must be aware of the possibility of individuals with the same name and must assume that the words published will be read by a reasonable man with reasonable care.

  Case Laws related to Defamation in favour of Claimant.  TOLLEY  Vs,  J.S FRY & SONS LTD – (1931) Facts The defendants were owners of chocolate manufacturing company. They advertised their products with a caricature of the claimant, who was a prominent amateur golfer, showing him with the defendants’ chocolate in his pocket while playing golf. The advertisement compared the excellence of the chocolate to the excellence of the claimant’s drive. The claimant did not consent to or knew about the advertisement.   Issue The claimant alleged that the advertisement suggested that he agreed to his portrait being used for commercial purposes and for financial gain. He further claimed that the use of his image made him look like someone who prostituted his reputation for advertising purposes and was thus unworthy of his status. At trial, several golfers gave evidence to the effect that if an amateur sold himself for advertisement, he no longer maintained his amateur status and might be aske

Rules as to delivery of goods

                             Rules as to delivery of goods Section 2(2) of Sale of Goods Act defines ‘delivery’ as a ‘voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another.’ Thus, if the transfer of goods is not voluntary and is taken by theft, by fraud, or by force, then there is no ‘delivery. Moreover, the ‘delivery’ should have the effect of putting the goods in possession of the buyer. The essence of the delivery is a voluntary transfer of possession of goods from one person to another. There is no delivery of goods where they are obtained at pistol point or theft. 1. Mode of Delivery: According to Section 33, delivery of goods sold may be made by doing anything which the parties agree shall be treated as delivery or which has the effect of putting the goods in the possession of the buyer or of any person authorized to hold them on his behalf. Delivery of goods may be actual, symbolic or constructive. 2. Expenses of Delivery: According to Section 36(5), unless otherwise agree