Skip to main content

Dulieu v. White & Sons

 Dulieu v. White & Sons

By: Robin Pandey                                                                        Date: 07/03/2022

Facts:

The defendant's servant negligently drove a horse van into the public house and the plaintiff, a pregnant woman who was standing there behind the bar, although not physically injured, suffered nervous shock. Consequent upon this, she got seriously ill and gave birth to a child, born an idiot. The plaintiff filed a suit for damages resulting from the aforesaid nervous shock due to the negligence of the servant of the defendants.

Defendant's submissions: No action for negligence will lie where there is no immediate physical injury resulting to the plaintiff. The bodily harm suffered by the plaintiff was, in point of law, too remote a consequence of negligence of the defendant's servant.

Legal Issue: Whether the servant was negligent and whether the plaintiff has good cause of action for damages?

 Court's Observations: In an action for negligence, it must be proved by the plaintiff that: 

(i) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff 

(ii) the defendant made a breach of that duty: and

(iii) the plaintiff suffered damages as a consequence thereof.

Negligence: The servant was negligent for breach of duty to use reasonable and proper care in managing the defendant’s van. The servant owed an identical duty to use reasonable and proper care to all the persons either on the highway or the property adjoining the highway or the persons who like the plaintiff, were lawfully occupying that property. The legal obligations of the driver of the horses are the same towards the man indoors as to the man outdoors. The significant question however was whether there could be an action for nervous shock?

Mental shock: In order to sustain such action it is necessary to prove that resulting damage was a natural and continuous sequence uninterruptedly connecting the breach of duty as to cause and effect. In this case, the negligent driving of the defendant's servant reasonably and naturally caused nervous or mental shock to the plaintiff by her reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily hurt; and that the premature child birth with the physical pain and suffering which accompanied it was a natural and direct consequence of the shock. It was not every nervous shock occasioned by negligence and producing physical injury to the sufferer which would give rise to an action but the shock, where it operates through the mind, must be a shock which arises from a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself.

Remoteness of the damages: In the Victorian Rail Case (1888), the Privy Council observed that the damages arising from mere sudden terror unaccompanied by any physical injury but occasioning a nervous mental shock cannot under such circumstances be considered a consequence which in the ordinary course of things, would flow from negligence. The Court differed with the view of the Privy Council and maintained that a claim for damage for physical injuries naturally and directly resulting from nervous shock which is due to the negligence of another in causing fear of immediate bodily hurt is in principle not too remote to be recoverable in law. The Court noted that if this rule was not adopted, it would involve the denial of redress in meritorious cases. 

Decision:

The suit must be decreed in favour of the plaintiff.


Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Section 58B of The Advocates Act - Special provision relating to certain disciplinary proceedings

 Section 58B The Advocates Act Description (1) As from the 1st day of September, 1963, every proceeding in respect of any disciplinary matter in relation to an existing advocate of a High Court shall, save as provided in the first proviso to sub-section (2), be disposed of by the State Bar Council in relation to that High Court, as if the existing advocate had been enrolled as an advocate on its roll. (2) If immediately before the said date, there is any proceeding in respect of any disciplinary matter in relation to an existing advocate pending before any High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (38 of 1926), such proceeding shall stand transferred to the State Bar Council in relation to that High Court, as if it were a proceeding pending before the corresponding Bar Council under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 56: Provided that where in respect of any such proceeding the High Court has received the finding of a Tribunal constituted under section 11 of the Indian B

Case Laws related to Defamation in favour of ClaimantCase Laws related to Defamation in favour of Claimant. TOLLEY Vs, J.S FRY & SONS LTD – (1931) Facts The defendants were owners of chocolate manufacturing company. They advertised their products with a caricature of the claimant, who was a prominent amateur golfer, showing him with the defendants’ chocolate in his pocket while playing golf. The advertisement compared the excellence of the chocolate to the excellence of the claimant’s drive. The claimant did not consent to or knew about the advertisement. Issue The claimant alleged that the advertisement suggested that he agreed to his portrait being used for commercial purposes and for financial gain. He further claimed that the use of his image made him look like someone who prostituted his reputation for advertising purposes and was thus unworthy of his status. At trial, several golfers gave evidence to the effect that if an amateur sold himself for advertisement, he no longer maintained his amateur status and might be asked to resign from his respective club. Furthermore, there was evidence that the possible adverse effects of the caricature on the claimant’s reputation were brought to the defendants’ attention. The trial judge found that the caricature could have a defamatory meaning. The jury then found in favor of the claimant. Held The House of Lords held that in the circumstances of this case – as explained by the facts – the caricature was capable of constituting defamation. In other words, the publication could have the meaning alleged by the claimant. The Lords also ordered a new trial limited to the assessment of damages. NEWSTEAD V LANDON EXPRESS NEWSPAPER LTD, (1939) Facts: A newspaper published a defamatory article about Harold Newstead. However, another person with this name brought an action in libel. He claimed that the article had been misunderstood as leading to him. The defendant newspaper recognised that they published the article. Also, they denied that they had the intention of being defamatory of him. Consequently, the claimant argued that the newspaper was under a duty. The duty was to give a clear and complete description of the correct person. Moreover, the claimant argued that the defendants were in breach of the duty. Issues: The issue in Newstead v London Express Newspaper, was if the reasonable persons would have understood the words complained of to refer to the plaintiff. Held: The Court of Appeal stated that in accordance with the current law on libel, liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer; but on the fact of the defamation. Accordingly, a reasonable man, in this case a newspaper publisher, must be aware of the possibility of individuals with the same name and must assume that the words published will be read by a reasonable man with reasonable care.

  Case Laws related to Defamation in favour of Claimant.  TOLLEY  Vs,  J.S FRY & SONS LTD – (1931) Facts The defendants were owners of chocolate manufacturing company. They advertised their products with a caricature of the claimant, who was a prominent amateur golfer, showing him with the defendants’ chocolate in his pocket while playing golf. The advertisement compared the excellence of the chocolate to the excellence of the claimant’s drive. The claimant did not consent to or knew about the advertisement.   Issue The claimant alleged that the advertisement suggested that he agreed to his portrait being used for commercial purposes and for financial gain. He further claimed that the use of his image made him look like someone who prostituted his reputation for advertising purposes and was thus unworthy of his status. At trial, several golfers gave evidence to the effect that if an amateur sold himself for advertisement, he no longer maintained his amateur status and might be aske

Rules as to delivery of goods

                             Rules as to delivery of goods Section 2(2) of Sale of Goods Act defines ‘delivery’ as a ‘voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another.’ Thus, if the transfer of goods is not voluntary and is taken by theft, by fraud, or by force, then there is no ‘delivery. Moreover, the ‘delivery’ should have the effect of putting the goods in possession of the buyer. The essence of the delivery is a voluntary transfer of possession of goods from one person to another. There is no delivery of goods where they are obtained at pistol point or theft. 1. Mode of Delivery: According to Section 33, delivery of goods sold may be made by doing anything which the parties agree shall be treated as delivery or which has the effect of putting the goods in the possession of the buyer or of any person authorized to hold them on his behalf. Delivery of goods may be actual, symbolic or constructive. 2. Expenses of Delivery: According to Section 36(5), unless otherwise agree