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Section 41 A Cr.P.C

 SECTION 41 A CRPC

By P.Hema


As per Section 41 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter, 'Cr. P.C.'), if

any police officer requires the participation of any individual who is not required to

be fundamentally arrested under Section 41(1) of Cr.P.C. or against whom a

reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or

a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, the

official can give a notice for the equivalent.

The individual to whom the Notice is served is obliged to show up at the specified

place and time. The individual confirming to the Notice will not be arrested except

if in any case considered fit by the Police for which the official is duty-bound to

record reasons in writing. Inability to consent to the Notice is a ground for arrest.

Section 41A was added by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act,

2008 (5 of 2009). However, recently after the enactment of this Amendment,

representations were received by the Union Government. Thus, some specific

amendments were brought in by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment)

Act, 2010 (41 of 2010).

The earlier sub-section (1) of Section 41A read: The police officer may, in all cases

where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of sub-section (1)

of section 41, issue a notice directing the person against whom a reasonable

complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a

reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, to appear

before him or at such other place as may be specified in the notice.

The 2010 amendment ensured that a police officer issues such Notice by

substituting 'shall' in place of may vide section 3(a) of the 2010 amendment Act.

The Amendment also enacted a proviso to section 41(1)(b)(ii) providing for

recording of reasons for not arresting an accused. However, the Supreme Court

directed in Arnesh Kumar case that issuing a notice of appearance under Section

41A was thoughtfully implemented. The Supreme Court held that their endeavor in

this judgment is to ensure that a police officer does not arrest any accused

unnecessarily, and the Magistrate does not authorize detention casually and

mechanically.

In Tanuja Roy v. State of Assam and Ors., an F.I.R. under Section 420 and 406

being held up against the accused, three police officers from the Dispur Police

Station powerfully took the Petitioner to the police headquarters at 1:00 am


regardless of opposition from the candidate. She was confined discretionarily, for

extended periods without being given any explanation, after which Notice was

served to her under Section 41A.

The game-plan received by the Police in the current case was uncalled-for. The

Court descended intensely upon the Police Officials while holding their activities

to be in contradiction of Section 46(4) of the Cr. P.C. Furthermore, not following

what Section 41A specifies to deter the force under Section 41A of Cr.P.C, the

investigating officer may control the F.I.R. Although the control of F.I.R. was not

demonstrated in the moment case, such action isn't altogether uncommon.

From the above discussion, because an examining officer having powers under the

Cr.P.C can arrest an accused person for the reasons under Section 41 of the Cr.P.C,

it isn't important to arrest a charged individual for each situation where a criminal

offence is enlisted and is under scrutiny.

A decent measure of discretion must be left with the investigating officer to be

reasonable for the public purpose behind the investigation, which is to discover

reality on account of criminal offences, which are traditionally, treated as offences

against the tranquility of the general public at large. Notwithstanding, this can't be

at the expense of fundamental procedural fairness.

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