Skip to main content

Bachan Singh V. State of Punjab AIR 1980 SC 898

 Bachan Singh V. State of Punjab AIR 1980 SC 898


Introduction:

The present case came out to be a burning issue with regard to the death penalty. Post Constitution many legislative efforts were made dealing with the feasibility and validity of capital punishment.  


Background:

The present case is a landmark case determining the constitutional validity of the death penalty for murder provided in Section 302 of IPC and the procedure embodied in Section 354, Sub-section (3) of CrPC, 1973. In the present case, the Supreme Court of India laid down the ‘rarest of the rare doctrine’ by imposing the limitations on the death penalty. This case is a landmark judgment given by a five-judge bench of the Hon’ble SC.


Facts:

The Appellant in a Criminal Appeal was convicted for the murders Desa Singh, Durga Bai, and Veeran Bai and sentenced to death under Section 302, Indian Penal Code by the Sessions Judge. The High Court confirmed his death sentence given by the sessions judge and dismissed his appeal. Bachan Singh, the appellant by Special Leave to Appeal came up for hearing before the Supreme Court to raise the consideration before the court that whether the facts of his case were “special reasons” for awarding him the death sentence as required in Section 354(3) of CrPC, 1973.


Issues:

Whether the death penalty provided for murder in Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is unconstitutional?

If the answer to the above question is negative, whether the sentencing procedure mentioned in Section, 354(3) of the CrPC, 1973 is unconstitutional on the ground that it gives unfettered power to Courts, allowing death sentence to be capriciously imposed on a person found guilty of murder punishable under IPC with death or with imprisonment for life?


Arguments Advanced:

Arguments on behalf of the Petitioner:

The very first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner was, that the death penalty for murder mentioned in Section 302 of IPC abridges Article 19 of the Constitution. It was humbly submitted by the counsel that the right to live in the basic enjoyment guaranteed to a citizen mentioned in clauses (a) to € and (g) and the death penalty puts an end to all these freedoms. As the death penalty serves no social purpose, the imposition of the same must be regarded as an “unreasonable restriction”. As the dignity of an individual is sombrely vouchsafed by the Preamble of the Indian Constitution, the imposition of the death penalty is a total prohibition of six Fundamental Rights guaranteed in 19(1).


Arguments on behalf of the Respondent:

The counsels on behalf of the respondents contended the principle of sic uteri tou ut alienum non laedas which means that a person may use the property in such a way that it does not injure someone else’s rights. They presented before the Court that the six rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute rights, they are subjected to inherent restraints, putting obligations on the member of civil society to use his/her rights in such a manner that it does not infringe or injure similar rights of others.


Judgment:

In the present case, the Supreme Court lucidly dismissed the challenges pertaining to the constitutionality of Section 302 of IPC and 354(3) of CrPC. It was made very clear by the court that Article 19 clauses (2) to (6) have been expressly made subject to the power of the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights of citizens. For the people convicted for the offense of murder, life imprisonment was made a rule and death sentence an exception. With the majority of 4:1, the Court struck down Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code as unconstituti  onal and void.


The bench while giving the decision said that “Judges are never bloodthirsty”. While giving the judgment the judges relied on the judgments of Jagmohan Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh,[ii] and Rajendra Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh,[iii] there was a plurality observed in the case of Rajendra Prasad and was further observed that a person loses his right to life when he is given a death sentence, abridging his fundamental right. In Jagmohan’s case, it was observed that the judges of the nation are vested with discretion in the matter of fixing the degree of the penalty or punishment. 


Conclusion:

The present case lay down specifically that the death penalty must be restricted to and given in “rarest of the rare cases”. Essentially the death penalty became an exception rather than a rule. It may be said that the case gave the landmark judgment that the death penalty must be considered an exception and life imprisonment a rule but failed to elaborate the criteria for the “rarest of the rare cases”. The bench gave two views in the case, the majority view is given by Justice Sarkaria, Chandrachud, Gupta; Untwalia validated the section 302 of IPC and 354(3) of CrPC on the touchstone of constitutionality. Nation’s attention has always been grabbed by the imposition of a death sentence.


Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Section 58B of The Advocates Act - Special provision relating to certain disciplinary proceedings

 Section 58B The Advocates Act Description (1) As from the 1st day of September, 1963, every proceeding in respect of any disciplinary matter in relation to an existing advocate of a High Court shall, save as provided in the first proviso to sub-section (2), be disposed of by the State Bar Council in relation to that High Court, as if the existing advocate had been enrolled as an advocate on its roll. (2) If immediately before the said date, there is any proceeding in respect of any disciplinary matter in relation to an existing advocate pending before any High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (38 of 1926), such proceeding shall stand transferred to the State Bar Council in relation to that High Court, as if it were a proceeding pending before the corresponding Bar Council under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 56: Provided that where in respect of any such proceeding the High Court has received the finding of a Tribunal constituted under section 11 of the Indian B

Case Laws related to Defamation in favour of ClaimantCase Laws related to Defamation in favour of Claimant. TOLLEY Vs, J.S FRY & SONS LTD – (1931) Facts The defendants were owners of chocolate manufacturing company. They advertised their products with a caricature of the claimant, who was a prominent amateur golfer, showing him with the defendants’ chocolate in his pocket while playing golf. The advertisement compared the excellence of the chocolate to the excellence of the claimant’s drive. The claimant did not consent to or knew about the advertisement. Issue The claimant alleged that the advertisement suggested that he agreed to his portrait being used for commercial purposes and for financial gain. He further claimed that the use of his image made him look like someone who prostituted his reputation for advertising purposes and was thus unworthy of his status. At trial, several golfers gave evidence to the effect that if an amateur sold himself for advertisement, he no longer maintained his amateur status and might be asked to resign from his respective club. Furthermore, there was evidence that the possible adverse effects of the caricature on the claimant’s reputation were brought to the defendants’ attention. The trial judge found that the caricature could have a defamatory meaning. The jury then found in favor of the claimant. Held The House of Lords held that in the circumstances of this case – as explained by the facts – the caricature was capable of constituting defamation. In other words, the publication could have the meaning alleged by the claimant. The Lords also ordered a new trial limited to the assessment of damages. NEWSTEAD V LANDON EXPRESS NEWSPAPER LTD, (1939) Facts: A newspaper published a defamatory article about Harold Newstead. However, another person with this name brought an action in libel. He claimed that the article had been misunderstood as leading to him. The defendant newspaper recognised that they published the article. Also, they denied that they had the intention of being defamatory of him. Consequently, the claimant argued that the newspaper was under a duty. The duty was to give a clear and complete description of the correct person. Moreover, the claimant argued that the defendants were in breach of the duty. Issues: The issue in Newstead v London Express Newspaper, was if the reasonable persons would have understood the words complained of to refer to the plaintiff. Held: The Court of Appeal stated that in accordance with the current law on libel, liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer; but on the fact of the defamation. Accordingly, a reasonable man, in this case a newspaper publisher, must be aware of the possibility of individuals with the same name and must assume that the words published will be read by a reasonable man with reasonable care.

  Case Laws related to Defamation in favour of Claimant.  TOLLEY  Vs,  J.S FRY & SONS LTD – (1931) Facts The defendants were owners of chocolate manufacturing company. They advertised their products with a caricature of the claimant, who was a prominent amateur golfer, showing him with the defendants’ chocolate in his pocket while playing golf. The advertisement compared the excellence of the chocolate to the excellence of the claimant’s drive. The claimant did not consent to or knew about the advertisement.   Issue The claimant alleged that the advertisement suggested that he agreed to his portrait being used for commercial purposes and for financial gain. He further claimed that the use of his image made him look like someone who prostituted his reputation for advertising purposes and was thus unworthy of his status. At trial, several golfers gave evidence to the effect that if an amateur sold himself for advertisement, he no longer maintained his amateur status and might be aske

Rules as to delivery of goods

                             Rules as to delivery of goods Section 2(2) of Sale of Goods Act defines ‘delivery’ as a ‘voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another.’ Thus, if the transfer of goods is not voluntary and is taken by theft, by fraud, or by force, then there is no ‘delivery. Moreover, the ‘delivery’ should have the effect of putting the goods in possession of the buyer. The essence of the delivery is a voluntary transfer of possession of goods from one person to another. There is no delivery of goods where they are obtained at pistol point or theft. 1. Mode of Delivery: According to Section 33, delivery of goods sold may be made by doing anything which the parties agree shall be treated as delivery or which has the effect of putting the goods in the possession of the buyer or of any person authorized to hold them on his behalf. Delivery of goods may be actual, symbolic or constructive. 2. Expenses of Delivery: According to Section 36(5), unless otherwise agree