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Case Analysis of Mohini Jain vs State of Karnataka

 Case Analysis of Mohini Jain vs State of Karnataka


The Supreme Court first recognized the right to education as a fundamental right in Mohini Jain vs State of Karnataka on July 30th, 1992. 

Equivalent citations: 1992 AIR 1858

Petitioner: Miss Mohini Jain

Respondent: State of Karnataka

Facts of the Case:

  • Karnataka State Government issued notification dated June 5,1989 under section 5(1) of the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 fixing the tuition fee, other fees and deposits to be charged from the students by the private medical college in the State.

  • The tuition fee per year for the candidates admitted in “Government Seats” was Rs 2000

  • Whereas for the Karnataka students (other than those admitted against “Government seats”) the tuition fee was not exceeding Rs 25,000

  • The students belonging to the category of “Indian students from outside Karnataka” were to pay the tuition fee not exceeding Rs 60,000 per annum.

Mohini Jain

  • A Resident of Meerut had applied for admission for a medical course at Sri Siddhartha Medical College, Karnataka, under the quota of government seats

  • But she was classified under the category of “Indian students from outside Karnataka”

  • College told her she could be admitted to the MBBS Course in the session commencing February/March 1991, provided she would deposit Rs 60,000 as the tuition fee for the 1st year and furnish a bank guarantee in respect of the fees for the remaining years of the MBBS Course. When the father of the petitioner informed the respondent No 3 that he could not pay the exorbitant annual tuition fee of Rs 60,000, the petitioner was denied admission.

  • Moreover, she also complained that the college management board had further asked her the capitation fee of rupee four and a half lakhs, which was later refused by the college.

Sri Siddharth Medical College

  • Criteria which have been followed in the private college regarding the capitation fees are not chargeable from those students who were qualified for the Government seats but only from those students who were from different classes.

  • The Management board of the college has the right to charges fees from those who didn’t come under the merit list.

  • They are a private medical college and there was no financial aid which was provided from the government Karnataka or the central government and also practically these private medical colleges used to incur 5 lakh Rupees as expenditure for MBBS course.

  • Lastly, they also contended that the private medical colleges have always followed the rule of law and abide by all the laws for the smooth functioning of the administration and also were justified in charging the capitation fees.

Legal questions before the court

  • Is there any Right to Education under Indian Constitution?

  • Is charging capitation fee arbitrary under Article-14?

  • Does Karnataka government order allow capitation fee to be changed?

  • Court held that through the Right to Education is not expressly mentioned as a Fundamental Right Article 38, 39(a), 41 and 45 of the Indian constitution make it clear that the constitution makes it obligatory for the state to provide education for its citizens.

The Judgement

  • Under article 21 an individual’s dignity cannot be assured unless he has a right to education.

  • Universal declaration of human rights, by the United Nations and several cases that held that the right to life encompasses more than ‘life and limb’ and including necessities of life, nutrition, shelter and literacy.

Also,

  • Charging capitation fee makes education inaccessible

  • Charging of a very high capitation fee violates Article 14 of the constitution.

  • Court recognized imparting Education is both charity and duty

  • Article 19(1)(g) was disregarded 

  • Education at higher level was virtually nationalized.


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