Skip to main content

History of the Delhi High court

 The High Court of Delhi was established on 31st October, 1966.

Initially, the High Court of Judicature at Lahore, which was established by a Letters

Patent dated 21st March, 1919, exercised jurisdiction over the then provinces of the

Punjab and Delhi. This position continued till the Indian Independence Act, 1947 when

the dominions of India and Pakistan were created.

The High Courts (Punjab) Order, 1947 established a new High Court for the territory of

what was then called the East Punjab with effect from 15th August, 1947. The India

(Adaptation of Existing Indian Laws) Order, 1947 provided that any reference in an

existing Indian law to the High Court of Judicature at Lahore, be replaced by a reference

to the High Court of East Punjab.

The High Court of East Punjab started functioning from Shimla in a building called

"Peterhoff". This building burnt down in January, 1981.

When the Secretariat of the Punjab Government shifted to Chandigarh in 1954-55, the

High Court also shifted to Chandigarh. The High Court of Punjab, as it is later came to

be called, exercised jurisdiction over Delhi through a Circuit Bench which dealt with the

cases pertaining to the Union Territory of Delhi and the Delhi Administration.

In view of the importance of Delhi, its population and other considerations, Parliament

thought it necessary to establish a new High Court of Delhi. This was achieved by

enacting the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 on 5th September, 1966.

The High Court of Delhi initially exercised jurisdiction not only over the Union Territory of

Delhi, but also Himachal Pradesh. The High Court of Delhi had a Himachal Pradesh

Bench at Shimla in a building called Ravenswood. The High Court of Delhi continued to

exercise jurisdiction over Himachal Pradesh until the State of Himachal Pradesh Act,

1970 was enforced on 25th January, 1971.

The High Court of Delhi was established with four Judges. They were Chief Justice

K.S.Hegde, Justice I.D.Dua, Justice H.R.Khanna and Justice S.K.Kapur. The

sanctioned strength of Judges of this High Court increased from time to time. Presently,

the sanctioned strength of Judges of the High Court of Delhi is 45 permanent Judges

and 15 Additional Judges.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Section 58B of The Advocates Act - Special provision relating to certain disciplinary proceedings

 Section 58B The Advocates Act Description (1) As from the 1st day of September, 1963, every proceeding in respect of any disciplinary matter in relation to an existing advocate of a High Court shall, save as provided in the first proviso to sub-section (2), be disposed of by the State Bar Council in relation to that High Court, as if the existing advocate had been enrolled as an advocate on its roll. (2) If immediately before the said date, there is any proceeding in respect of any disciplinary matter in relation to an existing advocate pending before any High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (38 of 1926), such proceeding shall stand transferred to the State Bar Council in relation to that High Court, as if it were a proceeding pending before the corresponding Bar Council under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 56: Provided that where in respect of any such proceeding the High Court has received the finding of a Tribunal constituted under section 11 of the Indian B

Case Laws related to Defamation in favour of ClaimantCase Laws related to Defamation in favour of Claimant. TOLLEY Vs, J.S FRY & SONS LTD – (1931) Facts The defendants were owners of chocolate manufacturing company. They advertised their products with a caricature of the claimant, who was a prominent amateur golfer, showing him with the defendants’ chocolate in his pocket while playing golf. The advertisement compared the excellence of the chocolate to the excellence of the claimant’s drive. The claimant did not consent to or knew about the advertisement. Issue The claimant alleged that the advertisement suggested that he agreed to his portrait being used for commercial purposes and for financial gain. He further claimed that the use of his image made him look like someone who prostituted his reputation for advertising purposes and was thus unworthy of his status. At trial, several golfers gave evidence to the effect that if an amateur sold himself for advertisement, he no longer maintained his amateur status and might be asked to resign from his respective club. Furthermore, there was evidence that the possible adverse effects of the caricature on the claimant’s reputation were brought to the defendants’ attention. The trial judge found that the caricature could have a defamatory meaning. The jury then found in favor of the claimant. Held The House of Lords held that in the circumstances of this case – as explained by the facts – the caricature was capable of constituting defamation. In other words, the publication could have the meaning alleged by the claimant. The Lords also ordered a new trial limited to the assessment of damages. NEWSTEAD V LANDON EXPRESS NEWSPAPER LTD, (1939) Facts: A newspaper published a defamatory article about Harold Newstead. However, another person with this name brought an action in libel. He claimed that the article had been misunderstood as leading to him. The defendant newspaper recognised that they published the article. Also, they denied that they had the intention of being defamatory of him. Consequently, the claimant argued that the newspaper was under a duty. The duty was to give a clear and complete description of the correct person. Moreover, the claimant argued that the defendants were in breach of the duty. Issues: The issue in Newstead v London Express Newspaper, was if the reasonable persons would have understood the words complained of to refer to the plaintiff. Held: The Court of Appeal stated that in accordance with the current law on libel, liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer; but on the fact of the defamation. Accordingly, a reasonable man, in this case a newspaper publisher, must be aware of the possibility of individuals with the same name and must assume that the words published will be read by a reasonable man with reasonable care.

  Case Laws related to Defamation in favour of Claimant.  TOLLEY  Vs,  J.S FRY & SONS LTD – (1931) Facts The defendants were owners of chocolate manufacturing company. They advertised their products with a caricature of the claimant, who was a prominent amateur golfer, showing him with the defendants’ chocolate in his pocket while playing golf. The advertisement compared the excellence of the chocolate to the excellence of the claimant’s drive. The claimant did not consent to or knew about the advertisement.   Issue The claimant alleged that the advertisement suggested that he agreed to his portrait being used for commercial purposes and for financial gain. He further claimed that the use of his image made him look like someone who prostituted his reputation for advertising purposes and was thus unworthy of his status. At trial, several golfers gave evidence to the effect that if an amateur sold himself for advertisement, he no longer maintained his amateur status and might be aske

Rules as to delivery of goods

                             Rules as to delivery of goods Section 2(2) of Sale of Goods Act defines ‘delivery’ as a ‘voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another.’ Thus, if the transfer of goods is not voluntary and is taken by theft, by fraud, or by force, then there is no ‘delivery. Moreover, the ‘delivery’ should have the effect of putting the goods in possession of the buyer. The essence of the delivery is a voluntary transfer of possession of goods from one person to another. There is no delivery of goods where they are obtained at pistol point or theft. 1. Mode of Delivery: According to Section 33, delivery of goods sold may be made by doing anything which the parties agree shall be treated as delivery or which has the effect of putting the goods in the possession of the buyer or of any person authorized to hold them on his behalf. Delivery of goods may be actual, symbolic or constructive. 2. Expenses of Delivery: According to Section 36(5), unless otherwise agree