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IDDAT

 IDDAT

By: Robin Pandey                                                                        Date: 14/03/2022

lddat is an Arabic word and its literal meaning is 'counting. Counting' here means counting the days of possible conception to ascertain whether a woman is pregnant or not. Under Muslim law, it is that period during which a woman is prohibited from re-marrying after the dissolution of her marriage. During this period the widow or a divorced wife is required to live a pure and simple life. The object of Iddat is to ascertain the paternity of a possible conception by her former husband. After divorce or death of the husband, if the woman re-marries immediately and a child is born within normal course, then there is every likelihood that the conception could be by the former husband and not by the present. It would be difficult, therefore, to establish as to who may be regarded as the father of such a child. To overcome this difficulty, Muslim law provides that where a marriage is dissolved (by divorce or death of the husband), the woman cannot re- marry before the expiry of a specified period called lddat. After this period, the possible conception by the former husband would naturally become apparent and visible. 

Marriage with a woman who is observing lddat is irregular under Sunni law. Under Shia law, the marriage contracted with woman observing lddat is void.

Different periods of lddat, which a woman is legally required to undergo, are given below:

(a) Dissolution of Marriage by Divorce

(i) When a valid marriage is dissolved by divorce and consummation has taken place, the duration of Iddat is three monthly courses. Divorce may take place by Talaq, lla, Zihar, Khula, Mubarat or under Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. If the woman is not subject to menstruation, this period is three lunar months. 

(ii) If the marriage has not been consummated, the woman is not required to observe the Iddat. 

(iii) If the woman is pregnant at the time of divorce then the duration of lddat extends till delivery of the child or abortion.

(b) Dissolution of marriage by Death of Husband 

(i) Where a valid marriage dissolves by the death of the husband, the duration of lddat is four months and ten days. If she is pregnant at the time of husband's death, it continues till the delivery of the child, or four months ten days whichever is longer. 

(ii) After the death of the husband, an Iddat of four months ten days must be observed by the widow even if the marriage was not consummated.

(c) Death of Husband During 'divorce-lddat’

The period of Iddat after divorce is three months. If the divorced woman is observing divorce-iddat of three months and her former husband dies before completion of three months, she has to start a fresh Iddat of four months and ten days from the date of husband's death. For example, where after completion of two months of divorce-iddat the former husband dies the divorced woman has to observe a fresh iddat of four months ten days. Thus, the total period of lddat in such case shall be five months ten days. 

(d) Commencement of Iddat The period of Iddat begins from the date of the divorce or death of the husband and not from the date on which the woman gets the information of her divorce or of the death of her husband. If she gets the information after the expiry of the specified term, she need not observe the required lddat.

Shia Law 

(i) A generally accepted tradition among the Shias is that lddat is not necessary if the woman is past the age of child bearing or has not attained puberty or if her menstruation is irregular or absent. 

(ii) Under Shia law, the marriage with a woman observing Iddat is void. 

Valid Retirement 

Under Sunni law if the husband and the wife are together for sometime in privacy and there is no social, moral or legal restriction in their intercourse, they are said to be in valid retirement (Khilwatus-Sahiha). If there is a valid retirement, it is presumed that actual consummation has taken place. Valid retirement is treated as equal to the actual consummation for purposes of dower, paternity of the child, certain prohibitions in marriage etc. and also for purposes of the observance of Iddat. 

Under Sunni law, therefore, divorce-iddat is necessary even if actual consummation could not be proved but a valid retirement has been established. 

Shia law-Under Shia law, valid retirement is not recognised; it is not regarded as equivalent to the actual consummation. Accordingly, if the marriage dissolves by divorce, the divorced wife is required to observe Iddat only where actual consummation has taken place.

Husband prohibited from remarrying during lddat 

The object of Iddat is to ascertain any possible conception from the former husband. The woman who has been divorced, is therefore, not free to remarry immediately. On the other hand, the husband need not wait and he is free to remarry immediately after the divorce. But in an exceptional situation, the husband is also prohibited from remarrying during the Iddat of his divorced wife. If a husband has four wives at a time and he divorces any one of them, then he is prohibited to marry again before the expiry of the term of lddat, which his divorced wife is undergoing.


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